Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 4.djvu/769

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THE SINGLE TAX: WHAT AND WHY 749

rent ought to be recognized, but that all ground rent, for the future, should be taken for the public use. But, as it is our present object to discuss only questions of taxation, we do not feel called upon to go any farther into the discussion of this question of natural right to the use of the earth. In all that we have to say, therefore, it must be understood that we refer, under the name of " single tax," only to a method of collecting all needed government revenue from ground rent alone.

Is the single tax a just method of taxation ?

That a tax of some amount upon ground rent, or the value of land, is just and right, is conceded by everyone. Universal theory and practice alike agree in recommending such a tax. As no one has ever disputed this, no argument need now be made in support of it. Is there any other tax of which the same thing can be said ? If not, then we certainly have a tremendous presumption in favor of making the only just tax the exclusive tax. Here is a tax which can be easily assessed, without asking any questions of the taxpayer, because the value of the thing assessed is known to everybody. Here is an income, which is not earned in any degree by the labor, skill, or effort of the per- son receiving it. The landlord does not make land or make rent. The moment that we attempt to collect taxes from any other source we find ourselves taking from men a portion of that which they have made by their own labor and skill, by methods which impose heav}- burdens upon honesty and put a premium upon fraud, evasion, and falsehood.

Beginning with direct taxes, every tax upon the value or income of personal property inevitably depends for its assess- ment upon the truthfulness of the taxpayer, since nobody but himself can do more than make a blind guess at what the value of his personal property is. If no sworn returns are required from him, then every assessment is a mere guess, and every tax- payer will pay either far too much or far too little. And as the power of evasion will increase in proportion to the extent and variety of his personal property, it follows that the more personal property any man possesses, the less in proportion is he likely to be taxed. If sworn returns are required, the burden is to some