5/2 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
"phenomena," our task is to find out, if we can, what, how, and why they are. When, in the case of social phenomena, we state the task for short in terms of the actions of men, we do not thereby posit a the- ory of "free-will," or "determinism," or anything else, anymore than we posit a theory of the metaphysics of matter when we state a topo- graphical problem in terms of geologic action. When we say that the surface phenomena of the earth are due to "geologic action," our proposition is essentially not declarative, but interrogative. It is merely an inverted form of expressing a problem of surface-building forces. We have put in the indicative mode the statement of the ques- tion to be investigated. In other words, we have merely boiled down the proposition: "We must now find out what the geologic forces are, and how they act in this case." In like manner, when we say that historic or contemporary events are forms of human actions, we are merely indicating our problem, viz. : "What, and how, and why are human actions ? "
It is hard to see how a purist in scientific method can overlook the absurdity of calling for an attitude toward social phenomena that either begs the question or proves to be meaningless alto- gether. "The scientific view is that human events are phenomena of the same general character as other phenomena" (p. 57). Turn- ing Ward's own form of expression upon himself, I would say there lurks in this way of putting it the ghost of the old doctrine of materialism. Flying from the ghost of free-will into the arms of the ghost of materialism may be natural, but it is neither dignified nor convincing. This phrase "same general character" is surely not less ambiguous than the innocent phrase "the actions of men." If we mean that there is some sort of regular nexus between human events, just as there is between all other occurrences, whether we have a clue to it or not, we are well within the limits of safety. If we mean that the nexus between antecedent and consequent in human events is the same as between other occurrences, we are simply substituting a dogma for the apparent pointings of the evidence. If a human choice is not generically different from a physiological or a chemical phenomenon, it is at least specifically so different from either that no physiology or chemistry in sight can begin to account for it. Moreover, when Ward goes on to speak of the "subtle psychic causes " that " so largely pro- duce " human events (p. 57), he shows that, according to his own standard of practice, the previous spook-hunting passage was merely a diversion in hypercriticism.
