device such as a glove box was used for this purpose, the subsequent decontamination and/or disposal of the device likewise would have aerosolized some spores. Both of these potential instances of contact put the perpetrator at risk of contracting inhalational anthrax. A prudent perpetrator would have certainly practiced some form of prophylaxis, either through anthrax vaccination and/or an antibiotic regimen, to protect himself from an anthrax infection. When a noted bioweaponeer from the U.S. offensive bio-weapons program of the 1960s learned that the spores were dried to the concentration of 2.10 x 1012 colony-forming units per gram, he observed, “NOW the price of poker just went up.”
- 4. Continuing investigative efforts
While the scientific analysis and forensic examinations described above were moving forward, Task Force agents pursued all the traditional investigative techniques that law enforcement organizations utilize in any other murder investigation. In the early years of the investigation, before genetic analysis led to the conclusion that RMR-1029, located at USAMRIID, was the parent material to the mailed spores, over 17,000 investigative leads and citizen tips were run down and eventually eliminated. A reward of one million dollars was offered by the FBI and USPIS for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the perpetrator, which was subsequently increased to $2.5 million. During the first four years of this investigation, the Amerithrax Task Force received 192 tip letters from the general public, each of which was reviewed for potential leads. For example, Task Force agents vigorously pursued the possibility that the letters were the result of a state-sponsored attack, and specifically focused on those governments known to have, or have had, an offensive biological weapons program. Task Force investigators also exhaustively explored the possibility that al Qaeda or another international terrorist organization may have been responsible for the 2001 attacks, conducting witness interviews and evidence collection efforts on six continents with its liaison partners overseas. While it is undoubtedly true that al Qaeda was seeking to establish an offensive bioweapons program in 2001 (see The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Chapter 5.1, at p. 151), Task Force agents were unable to find any link between al Qaeda and the letter attacks in the United States, or even that, at the time of the attacks, any al Qaeda operatives had access to the type and quality of anthrax pathogen used in the 2001 attacks.
Amerithrax investigators also pursued every lead that could be derived from the text of the anthrax letters and envelopes. On the envelopes addressed to the two U.S. Senators was written the fictitious return address of “4th Grade, Greendale School, Franklin Park NJ 08852.” There is no Greendale School in Franklin Park, New Jersey, and the zip code 08852 is assigned to the neighboring town of Monmouth Junction, not Franklin Park. Investigators tried to identify a connection between potential perpetrators and any U.S. locale or Internet website using any aspect of this return address, including the name Greendale, Franklin Park, or 08852, but nothing conclusive was found.
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