Page:Amerithrax Investigative Summary.pdf/40

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
  • A university in the southwest: Dr. Ivins sent a sample of what may have been RMR-1029 to a microbiologist at a university in the southwest in March 2001. He added that transfer to his Reference Material Receipt record more than three years after he actually sent the spores, based on information on a shipment request form dated March 2, 2001. The microbiologist opened it up, plated it out, and confirmed that it was viable (known as “checking CFUs”). This sample did not have the mutations that appear in the material used in the attacks. There are two possible explanations for this apparent discrepancy: (1) The anthrax that Dr. Ivins sent was not RMR-1029 at all, but rather some other Ba preparation, of which Dr. Ivins had perhaps a half-dozen in his collection. This explanation is supported by the fact that the concentration on the shipment request form did not match RMR-1029. In addition, on the day the material was sent out of his lab to this other facility, Dr. Ivins did not access B3 at all, making it possible that one of his lab technicians, who was in B3 that day, prepared the material to be sent to this facility, and drew it from another source at Dr. Ivins’s request. (2) The RMR-1029 that was sent to this facility was so diluted that the morphs fell below the level of detection of the current assays – which means that, while they may be there, they cannot be seen. When asked about this discrepancy in a later interview, Dr. Ivins claimed that he diluted RMR-1029 prior to shipping it to this facility.
5. Dr. Ivins’s considerable skill and familiarity with the necessary equipment

As discussed above, the spores used in the mailings were of a very high quality, very pure, and very concentrated. The production of spores of such quality would require both appropriate laboratory equipment – the kind found at universities, military research facilities, or other research institutions – and extensive experience in the purification process. Culturing anthrax and working safely with dried anthrax spores requires specific training and expertise in technical fields such as biochemistry or microbiology. It also requires access to particular laboratory equipment such as a biological safety cabinet or other containment device, an incubator, a centrifuge, a fermentor or a shaker with appropriate flasks, a lyophilizer or other drying device, and various personal protective gear, all of which Dr. Ivins had readily accessible to him through his employment at USAMRIID.[1] Further, in order to be permitted key-card


  1. Each of these various devices plays a particular and critical role in the production of Ba spores. As a general matter, work on a pathogen of this type must be performed in a laboratory equipped with special safety devices and negative air pressure, so that any spills can be contained. With respect to spore production, generally speaking, a researcher would obtain a very small sample of spores from another source and transfer this sample to a growth medium, such as a Sheep’s Blood Agar (“SBA”) plate or a liquid preparation, that contained a nutrient source for the spores. An SBA plate could then be incubated to foster growth of spores. After an appropriate period of time, 12 to18 hours was the standard protocol, the newly-grown spores would be harvested through an elaborate process, washed, and then spun down in a centrifuge to concentrate the spores. A fermentor can be used to grow large quantities of spores in a liquid preparation. Finally, as set forth supra in the Opportunity and Access section, a lyophilizer can be used to dry spores once they have been washed.

36