which is annex'd to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the Will, nor can be commanded at Pleasure. It must be excited by Nature, like all other Sentiments; and must arise from the particular Situation, in which the Mind is plac'd at any particular Juncture. Whenever any Object is presented to the Memory or Senses, it immediately, by the Force of Custom, carries the Imagination to conceive that Object, which is usually conjoin'd to it; and this Conception is attended with a Feeling or Sentiment, different from the loose Reveries of the Fancy. Herein consists the whole Nature of Belief. For as there is no Matter of Fact we believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no Difference betwixt the Conception assented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for some Sentiment, that distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a Billiard-Ball moving towards another, on a smooth Table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon Contact. This Conception implies no Contradiction; but still it feels very differently from that Conception, by which I represent to myself the Impulse, and the Communication of Motion from one Ball to another.
Were we to attempt a Definition or Description of this Sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not impossible Task; in the same Manner as if we should endeavour to define the Feeling ofCold
