Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/112

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98
SECTION V.

and throw them into such different and contrary Lights and Positions[1].

The more we converse with Mankind, and the greater social Entercourse we maintain, the more shall[errata 1] we be familiariz'd to these general Preferences and Distinctions, without which our Conversation and Discourse could scarcely be render'd intelligible to each other. Every Man's Interest is peculiar to himself, and the Aversions and Desires, which result from it, cannot be suppos'd to affect others in a

  1. For a like Reason, the Tendencies of Actions and Characters, not their real accidental Consequences, are alone regarded in our moral Determinations or general Judgments; tho' in our real Feeling or Sentiment, we cannot help paying greater Regard to one whose Station, join'd to Virtue, renders him really useful to Society, then to one, who exerts the social Virtues only in good Intentions and benevolent Affections. Separating the Character from the Fortune, by an easy and necessary Effort of Thought, we pronounce these Persons alike, and give them the same general Praise. The Judgment corrects or endeavours to correct the Appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail over Sentiment.
    Why is this Peach-tree said to be better than that other; but because it produces more or better Fruit? And would not the same Praise be given it, tho' Snails or Vermin had destroy'd the Fruit, before it came to full Maturity? In Morals too, is not the Tree known by the Fruit? And cannot we easily distinguish betwixt Nature and Accident, in the one Case as well as in the other?

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Errata

  1. Original: will was amended to shall: detail