Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/131

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Of Qualities useful to Ourselves.
117

be allow'd, that Sentiments are every Day experienc'd of Blame and Praise, which have Objects beyond the Dominion of the Will or Choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as Moralists, as speculative Philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory Theory and Explication.

A Blemish, a Fault, a Vice, a Crime; these Expressions seem to denote different Degrees of Censure and Disapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the Bottom, pretty nearly of the same Kind or Species[errata 1]. The Explication of one will lead us easily into a just Conception of the others.

PART II.

It seems evident, that where a Quality or Habit is subjected to our Examination, if it appear, in any respect, prejudicial to the Person, possest of it, or such as incapacitates him for Business and Action, it is instantly blam'd, and rank'd amongst his Faults and Imperfections. Indolence, Negligence, Want of Order and Method, Obstinacy, Fickleness, Rashness, Credulity; no one ever esteem'd these Qualities, indifferent to a Character; much less, extoll'd them as Accomplishments or Virtues. The Prejudice, resulting from them, immediately strikes ourEye, Errata

  1. Original: pretty nearly the same Kind of Species was amended to pretty nearly of the same Kind or Species: detail