Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/15

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SECTION I.

Of the General Principles of Morals.

Disputes with Persons, pertinaciously obstinate in their Principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with Persons, who really do not believe at all the Opinion they defend, but engage in the Controversy, from Affectation, from a Spirit of Opposition, or from a Desire of showing Wit and Ingenuity, superior to the rest of Mankind. The same blind Adherence to their own Arguments is to be expected[errata 1] in both; the same Contempt of their Antagonists; and the same passionate Vehemence, in inforcing Sophistry and Falshood. And as reasoning is not the Source, whence either Disputant derives his Tenets; 'tis in vain to expect, that any Logic, which speaks not to the Affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder Principles.

Those Errata

  1. Original: excepted was amended to expected: detail