Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/204

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190
SECTION IX.

It seems equally superfluous to prove, that the companionable Virtues of Good-manners and Wit, Decency and Genteelness are more desirable than the contrary Qualities. Vanity alone, without other Considerations, is a sufficient Motive to make us wish the Possession of these Accomplishments. No Man was ever willingly deficient in this Particular. All our Failures here proceed from bad Education, Want of Capacity, or a perverse and unpliable Disposition. Would you have your Company coveted, admir'd, follow'd; rather than hated, despis'd, avoided? Can any one seriously deliberate in the Case? As no Enjoyment is sincere, without some Reference to Company and Society; so no Society can be agreeable or even tolerable, where a Man feels his Presence unwelcome, and discovers all around him Symptoms of Aversion and Disgust.

But why, in the greater Society or Confederacy of Mankind, should not the Case be the same as in particular Clubs and Companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarg'd Virtues of Humanity, Generosity, Beneficence are desirable with a View to Happiness and Self-interest, than the limited Endowments of Ingenuity and Politeness? Are we apprehensive, that those social Affections have a greater and more immediate Interference, than anyother