cedents of Histories and public Records, are all directed to the same Purpose. And a very accurate Reason or Judgment is often requisite, to give the true Determination, amidst such intricate Doubts arising from obscure or opposite Utilities.
But tho' Reason, when fully assisted and improv'd, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful Tendencies of Qualities and Actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral Blame or Approbation. Utility is only a Tendency to a certain End; and were the End totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same Indifference towards the Means. 'Tis requisite a Sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a Preference to the useful above the pernicious Tendencies. This Sentiment can be no other than a Feeling for the Happiness of Mankind, and a Resentment of their Misery; since these are the different Ends, which Virtue and Vice have a Tendency to promote. Here therefore, Reason instructs us in the several Tendencies of Actions, and Humanity makes a Distinction in favour of those, which are useful and beneficial.
This Partition betwixt the Faculties of Understanding and Sentiment, in all moral Decisions, seems clear from the preceding Hypothesis. But I shall suppose that Hypothesis false: 'Twill then berequisite
