Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/216

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202
APPENDIX I.

the Case stated above, I see first Good-will and Good-offices, in one Person; then Ill-will and Ill-offices in the other: Betwixt these, there is the Relation of Contrariety. Does the Crime consist in that Relation? But suppose a Person bore me Ill-will or did me Ill-offices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him Good-offices: Here is the same Relation of Contrariety; and yet my Conduct is often highly laudable[errata 1]. Twist and turn this Matter, as much as you will, you can never rest the Morality on Relation; but must have Recourse to the Decisions of Sentiment.

When 'tis affirm'd, that two and three are equal to the half of ten; this Relation of Equality, I understand perfectly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two Parts, of which one had as many Unites as the other; and if any of these Parts be compar'd to two added to three, it will contain as many Unites as that compound Number. But when you draw thence a Comparison to moral Relations, I own, I am altogether at a loss to understand you. A moral Action, a Crime, such as Ingratitude, is a complicated Object. Does the Morality consist in the Relation of its Parts to each other. How? After what Manner? Specify the Relation: Be more particular and explicite in your Propositions; and you will easily see their Falshood.

No, Errata

  1. Original: is highly laudable was amended to is often highly laudable: detail