Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/228

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214
APPENDIX II.

Man embraces cheerfully an Opportunity of serving his Friend; because he then feels himself under the Dominion of the beneficent Affections, nor is he concern'd whether any other Person in the Universe was ever before actuated by such noble Motives, or will ever afterwards prove their Influence. In all these Cases, the social Passions have in View a single individual Object, and pursue alone the Safety or Happiness of the Person, lov'd and esteem'd. With this, they are satisfy'd: In this, they acquiesce. And as the Good resulting from their benign Influence, is in itself compleat and entire, it also excites the moral Sentiment of Approbation, without any Reflection on farther Consequences, or more enlarg'd Views of the Concurrence or Imitation of the other Members of Society. On the contrary, were the generous Friend or disinterested Patriot to stand alone in the Practice of Beneficence; this would rather inhance his Value in our Eyes, and join the Praise of Rarity and Novelty to his other more exalted Merits.

The Case is not the same with the social Virtues of Justice and Fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the Well-being of Mankind: But the Benefit, resulting from them, is not the Consequence of every individual single Act; but arises from the whole Scheme or System, con-cur'd