Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/74

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
60
SECTION III.

These Reflections are far from weakening the Obligations of Justice, or diminishing any Thing from the most sacred Attention to Property. On the contrary, such Sentiments must acquire new Force from the present Reasoning. For what stronger Foundation can be desir'd or conceiv'd for any Duty than to observe, that human Society, or even human Nature could not subsist, without the Establishment of it, and will still arrive at greater Degrees of Happiness and Perfection, the more inviolable the Regard is, which is pay'd to that Duty?

    'Tis remarkable, that the moral Decisions of the Jesuits and other relax'd Casuists, were commonly form'd in Prosecution of some such Subtilities of Reasoning as are here pointed at, and proceeded as much from the Habit of scholastic Refinement as from any Corrruption of the Heart, if we may follow the Authority of Monsr. Bayle. See his Dictionary, Article Loyola. And why has the Indignation of Mankind rose so strong against these Casuists; but because every one perceiv'd, that human Society could not subsist were such Practices authoriz'd, and that Morals must always be handled with a View to public Interest, more than philosophical Regularity? If the secret Direction of the Intention, said every Man of Sense, could invalidate a Contract; where is our Security? And yet a metaphysical Schoolman might think, that where an Itrtention was suppos'd to be requisite, if that Intention really had not Place, no Consequence ought to follow, and no Obligation be impos'd. The casuistical Subtilities may not be greater than the Subtilities of Lawyers, hinted at above; but as the former are pernicious, and the latter innocent and even necessary, this is the Reason of the very different Reception they meet with from the World.

Thus