CHAPTER XVI
CAUSAL COMPONENTS
60. Apparent and Causal Characters. 60.1 Are there any material objects in nature? That there are such bodies is certainly an assumption habitually made in the applications of mathematics. But the assumption does not supersede the necessity for enquiry.
We may roughly summarise the properties of material objects, as here defined, by saying that they should be continuous both in time and in space. But this is just what ordinary perceptual objects appear to be. Now perceptual objects are what they appear to be; for a perceptual object is nothing else than the permanent property of its situations, that they all shall exhibit those appearances. Accordingly if a perceptual object appears to be a material object, it is a material object.
Now here a difficulty arises; for we all know that, according to Dalton’s atomic theory of chemistry, any apparently continuous substance is a discrete collection of molecules, and that furthermore, according to the more recent theories, a molecule is a discrete collection of electric charges. Accordingly, as we are told, if we could take the minutest drop of water and magnify it, the phenomena would be analogous to those of a swarm of flies in a room.
It would appear therefore that we are mistaken in classifying a drop of water as being a material object.
60.2 The position that we seem to have arrived at is that on the one hand a drop of water is a material object, because it appears to be one and it is whatever
