Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them: But even natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propositions, which are sure to meet with Assent as soon as they are understood. That two Bodies cannot be in the same place, is a Truth that no Body any more sticks at, than at that Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; That White is not Black, That a Square is not a Circle, That Yellowness is not Sweetness: These, and a million of other such Propositions, as many at least, as we have distinct Idea's, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If then these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate Propositions, as Men have distinct Idea's; but as many as Men can make Propositions, wherein different Idea's are denied one of another. Since every Proposition, wherein one different Idea is denied of another, will as certainly find Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this general one, It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be; or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, The same is not different: By which Account, they will have Legions of innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the Idea's about which it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our Idea's of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.
§. 19. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, That One and Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red, &c. are received as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look'd on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the Pains to observe, what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.
§. 20. If it be said, that these Propositions, viz. Two and Two are equal to Four; Red is not blue, &c. are not general Maxims, nor of any great use. I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, they being upon this Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract Idea's, being more strangers to our first Apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and therefore, 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.
§. 21. But we have not yet done with assenting to Propositions at first hearingand
