believe) yet, I think, few Children can be supposed to have those Idea's, which therefore they must begin to have sometime or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that Proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the Ideas to be innate, than it does, That one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couched to morrow) had the innate Ideas of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; because when his Sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this Proposition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow: And therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the Ideas innate, it can much less the Propositions made up of those Ideas. If they have any innate Ideas, I would be glad to be told, what, and how many they are.
§. 20. Besides what I have already said, there is another Reason, why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other Principles are innate. I that am fully perswaded, that the infinitely Wise GOD made all Things in perfect Wisdom, cannot satisfie my self, why he should be supposed to print upon the Minds of Men, some universal Principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern Speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern Practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other Truths, not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose should Characters be graven on the Mind, by the finger of God, which are not clearer there, than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguish'd from? If any one thinks there are such innate Ideas and Propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the Mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us, which they are; and then every one will be a fit Judge, whether they be so, or no. Since if there be such innate Idea's and Impressions, plainly different from all our other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate Maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.
§. 21. To conclude, some Ideas forwardly offer themselves to all mens Understandings; and some sorts of Truths result from any Ideas, as soon as the Mind puts them into Propositions: Other Truths require a train of Ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered, and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easie reception, have been mistaken for innate: But the truth is, Ideas and Notions are no more born with us, than Arts and Sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our Faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received; though that too, be according as the Organs of our Bodies, and Powers of our Minds, happen to be employ'd; God having fitted Men with faculties and means, to discover, observe, and retain Truths, accordingly as they are employ'd. The great difference that is to be found in the Notion of Mankind, is, from the different use they put their Faculties to, whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of Assent, by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their Duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit saith, to swallow: Others employing their Thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their Thoughts loose, in the search of other Enquiries. Thus, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, is a Truth, as certain as any thing can be; and I think more evident, than many of those Propositions that go for Principles; andyet
