intends happiness to be equal; and to be so it must be social, since all particular happiness depends on general, 35. As it is necessary for order, and the peace and welfare of society, that external goods should be unequal, happiness is not made to consist in these, 47. But, notwithstanding that inequality, the balance of happiness among mankind is kept even by providence, by the two passions of hope and fear, 66. What the happiness of individuals is, as far as is consistent with the constitution of this world; and that the good man has here the advantage, 76. The error of imputing to virtue what are only the calamities of nature, or of fortune, 92. The folly of expecting God should alter his general laws in favour of particulars, 118. That we are not judges who are good; but that, whoever they are, they must be happiest, 130, &c. That external goods are not the proper rewards, but often inconsistent with, or destructive of virtue, 166. That even these can make no man happy without virtue; instanced in riches, 176. Honours, 184. Birth, 203. Greatness, 213. Fame, 233. Superior talents, 257. with pictures of human infelicity in men possest of them all, 275, &c. That virtue only constitutes a happiness, whose object is universal, and whose prospect eternal, 304, &c. That the perfection of virtue and happiness consists in a conformity to the order of providence here, and a resignation to it here and hereafter, 326, &c.
AN
