for all acts of conspicuous bravery, whether these deeds are done by himself or others; and he has a feeling of moral disapprobation for all deliberate lies, whether they are told by him or by others. His moral judgment depends on his feeling-attitude. All actions for which he has a feeling of moral approval are right, and all actions for which he has a feeling of moral disapproval are wrong.
Now, at first sight, this standard seems a very simple one. We know when we have feelings of moral approbation or disapprobation, and therefore we shall always know which actions are right and which are wrong.
But a difficulty immediately arises. All men do not feel in the same way. I may feel strong moral disapprobation for a certain action, but your feeling of moral approbation may be equally strong. Many excellent people feel that it is always wrong for anybody to go to the theatre, but many excellent people feel that it is quite right. Now it is impossible for the same action to be at one and the same time both right and wrong: if it is right, it cannot be at the same time wrong; and if it is wrong, it cannot be at the same time right. Yet, towards the same action, say A's going to the theatre, B feels moral approbation, and C feels moral disapproval. B bases his moral judgment on his feeling, and says that A's conduct is right: C bases his judgment on his feeling, and says that A's conduct is wrong. But A's conduct must be either right or wrong: it cannot be both right and wrong. Therefore either B's judgment or C's judgment is wrong, and consequently one of them must have been using a
