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173
PLEASURE IN THE MORAL LIFE
and that even if the elaborate process of addition and subtraction could be performed, it would take such a long time that it would generally be impossible to use the standard in dealing with the ordinary difficulties and perplexities of life.[1]
Further, Bentham assumes that we have the power
- ↑ It is interesting to try to apply the standard in a particular case. Suppose at the beginning of March a man is in doubt whether he ought to take a fortnight's holiday alone in the South of Franco at Easter, or take his family to the Coast for a month in August. He decides to calculate the value of the two courses of action in terms of pleasure according to the Utilitarian method. Call the first course of action X and the second Y. Consider these lines of conduct with reference to the various aspects of pleasure. With regard to (a) the intensity of pleasure, X is preferable; (b) with regard to duration, Y is more desirable; (c) X is more certain (he may be dead by the time August comes, and besides, the weather is much more apt to interfere with the enjoyment of the Coast holiday); (d) in respect to nearness, X is preferable; (e) with regard to fecundity, X is probably preferable (he will have experiences and see things and take photographs on the Mediterranean holiday which will be a constant source of pleasure for months afterwards); (f) with regard to purity, X is probably again preferable (on the Mediterranean holiday he will be free from the petty irritations and domestic annoyances which are apt to spoil a family holiday for him); (g) in extent, Y is preferable. Now, if we sum up, without attempting to give numerical values to the preferences we find that on five of the seven counts X is preferable. Thus, it would seem to follow that X is the right course of action. But there is no doubt at all that in most actual cases X would be wrong. It would not be wrong in all cases. It depends largely on circumstances. If the father were threatened with consumption, a fortnight's escape from the fog and cold and wet of the North might save his life. Under these circumstances he would act rightly in taking the "selfish" holiday. But in normal circumstances he would be wrong. This illustration shows clearly not only how impossible it is to apply this rule to decide concrete cases of rightness and wrongness; but also that it is unsatisfactory to try to apply mechanically any rule to moral actions. The rightness of actions is relative to the self which does them, and is much affected by the circumstances under which they are performed.
