Page:An introduction to ethics.djvu/193

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176
AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS.

and comprehensive. If I desire to finish writing this chapter, the proximate and narrow object of my desire is simply the cessation of the tiring physical activity of writing. But another object, more comprehensive and remote, is implied. I desire to reach the end of the chapter because it contributes to the completion of the book, and I desire to finish the book in order that it may be in the hands of my students. As we have seen in Chapter IV., our desires can be organised under more and more comprehensive desires, until they become entirely systematised in accordance with a dominant ambition. It is only in very rare cases that pleasant feeling is either a proximate or remote object of desire. No doubt there have been men whose desires have centred in enjoying the greatest variety of pleasurable feelings, and who have organised their whole lives in deference to this aim. And there are men who desire particular objects solely because of the pleasurable feeling which accompanies their attainment. But such men are exceptions. What we desire, in general, is a particular object. We enjoy the feelings which accompany its pursuit and attainment. But what we desire is the object, in so far as it contributes to the realisation of our dominant aims and purposes.

(2) We may desire objects though we are aware that their attainment will be attended with disagreeable feelings. A man desires to be a martyr or to die in his country's cause, though he realises that the torture and death will be accompanied by a very unpleasant affective tone. To take a less extreme case, a man will "scorn delights and live