Page:Appearance and Reality (1916).djvu/55

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The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as appearance. It will explain why we deny that, in the character which they exhibit, they either have or belong to reality. I will first show this of space.

We have nothing to do here with the psychological origin of the perception. Space may be a product developed from non-spatial elements; and, if so, its production may have great bearing on the question of its true reality. But it is impossible for us to consider this here. For, in the first place, every attempt so to explain its origin has turned out a clear failure.[1] And, in the second place, its reality would not be necessarily affected by the proof of its development. Nothing can be taken as real because, for psychology, it is original; or, again, as unreal, because it is secondary. If it were a legiti-

  1. I do not mean to say that I consider it to be original. On the contrary, one may have reason to believe something to be secondary, even though one cannot point out its foundation and origin. What has been called “extensity” appears to me (as offered) to involve a confusion. When you know what you mean by it, it seems to turn out to be either spatial at once and downright, or else not spatial at all. It seems useful, in part, only as long as you allow it to be obscure. Does all perception of more and less (or all which does not involve degree in the strict sense) imply space, or not? Any answer to this question would, I think, dispose of “extensity” as offered. But see Mind, iv. pp. 232-5.