Syllabus
(b) Arellano sees §5110(b)(1) as a simple time limit and therefore a classic case for equitable tolling. But §5110(b)(1) cannot be understood independently of §5110(a)(1), which makes the date of claim receipt the effective date “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter.” This language is an instruction to attend to specifically enacted language to the exclusion of general, unenacted carveouts. Arellano relies on a separate exception in §5110(b)(4)—which makes disability pension benefits retroactive in certain cases where permanent and total disability prevents a veteran from applying for an award at the time of disability onset—to argue that Congress wanted traditional principles of equitable tolling to apply to §5110(b)(1). To the contrary, §5110(b)(4) demonstrates that Congress had on its radar the possibility that disability could delay an application for benefits and still Congress did not explicitly account for that possibility in §5110(b)(1). Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, distinguished. Finally, Arellano contends that the nature of the subject matter—veterans’ benefits—counsels in favor of tolling because providing benefits to veterans is a context in which individualized equities are paramount. But the nature of the subject matter cannot overcome statutory text and structure that foreclose equitable tolling. Pp. 9–11.
1 F. 4th 1059, affirmed.
