Opinion of the Court
against which Congress drafts limitations periods.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 8). Consistent with this jurisprudential backdrop, we presume that federal statutes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990). The Irwin presumption, however, is just that—a presumption. It can be rebutted, and if equitable tolling is inconsistent with the statutory scheme, courts cannot stop the clock for even the most deserving plaintiff. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48–49 (1998).
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs advances two reasons why §5110(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling. The first would head tolling off at the pass: He argues that §5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations, so the presumption is wholly inapplicable. See Lozano, 572 U. S., at 13–14 (“[W]e have only applied” Irwin’s presumption “to statutes of limitations”). Rather than extinguishing a tardy claim (the function of a statute of limitations), §5110(b)(1) caps the award for a successful claim (a different function). Brief for Respondent 18–22. That it does so with reference to the time of filing, the Secretary says, does not convert it into a statute of limitations. Id., at 21. In any event, the Secretary adds, equitable tolling is at odds with the statutory text and structure—so even assuming that §5110(b)(1) sets a limitations period, the presumption is rebutted.
We need not address the Secretary’s first argument because the second is straightforward. The presumption is rebutted if “there [is] good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997). In this case, there is very good reason to draw that conclusion. Section 5110 contains detailed instructions for when a veteran’s claim for benefits may enjoy an effective date earlier than
