Hermoticus made the "mind to be the cause as well of
existence in animals as of the universe and universal order."
There is, evidently, here a want of distinction between
mind and Vital Principle; and it may be that, in order
to avoid the obvious objection of two bodies in one,
Aristotle has always delineated this faculty as homoge-
neous and pure; that is, as immaterial.
Note 4, p. 40. For if an aged person.] This allusion to diminished perception, by changes, from the influence of time, in the sentient organs, implies all that can now be said; for could the organ be restored to its pristine form, and its energies be, so to say, revived, the aged person would see or hear as he did when young. The body is modified, in fact, by age, just as it is, to use Aristotle's apposite reflexion, by maladies and rioting, which anticipate the otherwise slower processes of time; "Senectus non eo existat, quod anima sed quod id patitur in quo inest, i. e. corpus, sicut in ebrietate et morbis."
Note 5, p. 41. Thus, too, thought and reflexion languish.] Quid sit, quod intus perire dicatur, commenta-
tores quærunt; sed nihil definiendum, nisi quod oculi
similitudini respondeat[1]; but Philoponus, who is here
cited, clearly perceived that the passage pointed to the
destruction of a corporeal organ, and not to a mere change
of form. Whenever, in fact, there is destruction, however
brought about, of a corporeal organ, there is almost
universally mental disturbance and delirium.
- ↑ Trendel. Comment.
