CHAPTER V.
Note 1, p. 47. Now, three modes of defining Vital
Principle, &c.] There is here a want of conformity with
other definitions of the Vital Principle, which points
either to neglect on the part of copyists, or to want of
early revision; for, in one place, Aristotle has distin-
guished the animate from the inanimate by "motion and
sensibility," while in another he has conjoined with them
immateriality; and here, also, he has three terms, but
incorporeity, as if to approach nearer to the doctrines of
his great preceptor, is substitued for sensibility.
Note 2, p. 47. This opinion has been adopted, &c.]
The elements, and the parts assigned to them in the
constitution of bodies, by the schools of antiquity, have
been noticed in a former note; but the notion that, as
like perceives like, the Vital Principle, being derived
from the elements, must perceive each like, cannot account
for the perception of compound bodies, unless, (which is
an absurdity) it contain, essentially, all compounds what-
ever. This is all very hypothetical, no doubt, but then
it assumes that there are elements, and that elements
combine, by affinity, in different proportions, to form
different bodies; and, thus, the doctrine may be regarded
as a faint outline of the matured theory of modern times.
