CH. V.] NOTES. 239
Note 5, p. 50. It follows, too, from this theory, &c.] Empedocles regarded affinity (φιλίαν) as an element, but what the deity to which he refused, so to say, repulsion (τὸ νεῖκος) is uncertain ; "whether Sphærus or not, it implies, at all events a being, to which ‘repulsion’ (in quern pugna non admittitur) had not been imparted." If this, like affinity, were an element, then, as each sentient being was supposed to be constituted of all the elements, that deity must have been less favoured than other beings, since he was unconscious of antagonistic properties, and therefore, relatively, less intelligent than they.
Note 6, p. 50. But we are at a loss to know, &c.] Aristotle here inquires what the particular faculty or force may be which individualises, makes one, that is, of objects; and, thereby, gives to the sentient being the consciousness of identity. It cannot be a sense, as the senses are derived from the elements, and the elements are akin to matter, while that, whatever it be, which combines the faculties and powers of the body must, of all, be the most influential; and it may be inferred rather than gathered from what is said, that it cannot be either the Vital Principle or the mind. But do not all these doubts and suggestions point to a central organ where the sentient impressions, so to say, meet, and where con-
sciousness has its seat? Does not the brain, which, as the source of sensibility was then it may be said un-
known, fulfil all that is required by this suggestion? The
- Trendel. Comment.