being furnished with senses, and, above all, with that which first is manifested—the Touch; and, elsewhere[1], he says, that every animal, as such, must have some one sense, since it is by sensibility that we distinguish what is from what is not an animal. "It is further suggested that animals may be distinguished, grouped that is, after sentient and reasoning faculties, and that Zoology may thus be founded on universal and demonstrable principles.
Note 5, p. 67. As that by which we live and feel.] As life, that is, implies a body and living principle, so knowledge implies faculties and mind; and health the liability to sickness; but as Vital Principle is said to be the cause of life and feeling, it is, as such, a creative energy, and cannot, therefore, be matter and subject. It cannot, that is, be a mere faculty or function, or be subject to what is termed sickness.
Note 6, p. 68. On which account it is happily assumed, &c.] This is a summary of what had been said concerning that something, whatever it be, which constitutes a living body and distinguishes it from inert or inanimate matter; and, although very indefinite, it still is all which can be said concerning it. Aristotle guards against the assumption, as Vital Principle requires for its manifestation peculiar matter and exact relation, that it may animate any kind of body, and thus the argument reverts to living matter and its capability of organism, as the germ, so to say, of animal existence. This necessary relation between
- ↑ De Sensu et Sens. I. 6. 7.
