Page:Aristotelous peri psuxes.djvu/42

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32
ARISTOTLE ON THE
[BK. I.

and that the universe may move in accordant orbits, he bent the straight line into a circle, and dividing that circle into two united in two parts, he again divided the single circle into seven others, as if to indicate that the orbits of the sky are the movements of the Vital Principle.

But, in the first place, it is not correct to say that the Vital Principle is magnitude, for Timæus evidently means that this Principle of the universe is such as is the so-called mind; and, then, that Principle of the universe can resemble neither the sentient nor the concupiscent faculty, as neither of these moves in a circle. The mind is one and continuous as is cogitation, and cogitation as are thoughts, and thoughts are, by concatenation, one, in the sense, not of magnitude, but of number; and, therefore, the mind is not continuous in the sense of magnitude, but either it is without parts, or, at all events, not continuous as magnitude. How, indeed, were it magnitude, is it to think—as a whole, or by some one of its parts? But parts must be regarded either as magnitude, or as points, if, indeed, a point may be regarded as a part; and, if parts be considered as points, then, as points are innumerable, the mind, clearly, will never be able to recount them all, and if, as magnitude, the mind will have to dwell very often, or rather continuously, upon the same subject. But it is manifest that thinking may be exercised once for all. If, besides, it