Gorsuch, J., dissenting
modes of life.’ ” Id., at 49. In time, he imagined, “ ‘the old Indians will die off and carry with them the latent longings for murder and robbing; the young ones will take their places without these longings: and thus, little by little, they will become a happy and contented people.’ ” Ibid. This vision found support from others in the federal government. As Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole put it in his annual report, the situation with the Navajo “ ‘demand[ed] the earliest possible interposition of the military force of the government.’ ” Ibid. In his view, only putting the Navajo on a “ ‘suitable reservatio[n]’ ” would end their “ ‘wild and predatory life.’ ” Ibid.
In settling on this plan, the federal government had goals in mind beyond reducing conflict. As Carleton explained, “ ‘[b]y the subjugation and colonization of the Navajo [T]ribe we gain for civilization their whole country, which is much larger in extent than the [S]tate of Ohio, and, besides being the best pastoral region between the two oceans, is said to abound in the precious as well as [other] useful metals.’ ” Id., at 50. The “ ‘exodus of this whole people from the land of their fathers’ ” would be, he imagined, “ ‘a touching sight.’ ” Ibid. But no matter. He saw it as the Navajo’s “ ‘destiny’ ” to “ ‘give way to the insatiable progress of our race.’ ” Ibid.
Removal demanded finding a new home for the Tribe. Carleton picked the location himself: an area hundreds of miles from the Navajo’s homeland “commonly called the Bosque Redondo.” Ibid.; see also Kessell 254. Warning signs flashed from the start. Officers tasked with surveying the site cautioned that it was “ ‘remote’ ” from viable “ ‘forage’ ” and that “ ‘[b]uilding material’ ” would have to come from a significant distance. Iverson 50. Worse, they foundthat the water supply was meager and contained “ ‘much unhealthy mineral matter.’ ” Ibid.; see also Kessell 269. Carleton ignored these findings and charged ahead with his plan. Iverson 50.
