Gorsuch, J., dissenting
The Tribe’s lawsuit asks for nothing of the sort. The Tribe expressly disavows any suggestion that, “as a matter of treaty interpretation … the United States is legally obligated to pay for pipelines or aquifers,” for example. Tr. of Oral Arg. 78. Instead and again, the Tribe’s complaint seeks simply to “compel the Federal Defendants to determine the water required to … fulfill the promise[s]” made to them under the Treaty of 1868. App. 86. Only if the United States is, in fact, “interfer[ing] with [their] reserved water rights” in some way, ante, at 6, could the Tribe then ask the federal government to “devise a plan” for achieving compliance with its obligations, App. 86. And, for all anyone presently can tell, the United States may be interfering in just that way. Asking the federal government to assess what it holds in trust and to ensure that it is not misappropriating water that belongs to the Tribe has nothing to do with building pipelines or farming land.
B
Having mistaken the nature of the Navajo’s complaint, the Court proceeds next to analyze it under the wrong legal framework. Citing cases like United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U. S. 162 (2011); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U. S. 488 (2003) (Navajo I); and United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I), the Court tries to hammer a square peg (the Navajo’s request) through a round hole (our Tucker Acts framework). See ante, at 7–9, and n. 1. To understand why those cases are inapposite, a little background is in order.
When an Indian Tribe seeks damages from the United States, it must usually proceed under the terms of the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491, and the Indian Tucker Act, §1505. Together, those provisions facilitate suits for money damages in the Court of Federal Claims for claims “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
