Gorsuch, J., dissenting
this Court allowed a claim for money damages based on the United States’ breach of its “fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements” on a reservation. 537 U. S., at 468. The Tribe defended the right to bring that claim by pointing to a statute declaring certain lands would be “ ‘held by the United States in trust’ ” for the Tribe and allowing the Secretary of the Interior to use “ ‘any part’ ” of those lands “ ‘for administrative or school purposes.’ ” Id., at 469. In holding that statute sufficient to support a claim for money damages, this Court emphasized the United States exercised authority over the assets at issue and had considerable “discretionary authority” over their use. Id., at 475.
Held even to these yardsticks, the Navajo’s complaint easily measures up. Our Winters decisions recognize that the United States holds reserved water rights “[a]s a fiduciary” for the Tribes. Arizona II, 460 U. S., at 627–628 (emphasis added). The United States’ control over adjacent water sources—including the Colorado River—is “elaborate.” Mitchell II. 463 U. S., at 225; see also Arizona I, 373 U. S., at 564–565; White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S., at 475. It can dole out water in parts of the Colorado by contract. 43 U. S. C. §617d. And, of course, the United States has expressly acknowledged that it holds water rights “in trust” for the Navajo, see Brief for Federal Parties 37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, perhaps including rights in the Colorado River mainstream, id., at 33. Given these features, the Navajo’s complaint more than suffices to state a claim for relief.
IV
Where do the Navajo go from here? To date, their efforts to find out what water rights the United States holds for them have produced an experience familiar to any American who has spent time at the Department of Motor Vehicles. The Navajo have waited patiently for someone, anyone, to help them, only to be told (repeatedly) that they have been standing in the wrong line and must try another. To
