WYNNE, J., not participating.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Courts in Arkansas possess a broad contempt power to facilitate the enforcement of orders, maintenance of dignity, and preservation of authority. While statutes offer guidance in defining offending acts and outlining appropriate punishments, the contempt power is ultimately inherent to the court. It is precisely because of the contempt power's broad scope, however, that this court must take seriously its duty to police whether contempt penalties imposed are "supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom." See, e.g., Perroni v. State, 358 Ark. 17, 25, 186 S.W.3d 206, 211 (2004). The majority's expansive view of contempt power here, however, opens the door for courts to use that power outside of its traditional role. Instead of maintaining the authority and dignity of the court, the power could be used to micromanage case presentation decisions that have historically been made by the parties and their attorneys. While I support a broad interpretation of the contempt power, I am concerned that this new expansion may lead to abuse. In finding contempt in this case, the circuit court made unreasonable inferences based on thin evidence; this court should reverse. I therefore must respectfully dissent.
At the most basic level, the alleged contemptuous act here is that Tony Huffman, an attorney with the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), and Erica Eneks, a DHS caseworker, "colluded"—to use the loaded language of the circuit court—to have Eneks absent from the courtroom during a hearing in a dependency-neglect case. No one contends that Eneks's presence was required by law or by court order, nor had she been subpoenaed by any party. The majority also concedes that Eneks's presence was not required by court rule (choosing to disregard some ill-founded comments by the circuit court indicating that
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