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But the German system is not without its shortcomings.
(1) The continuous offensive involves a danger of exhaustion, especially for the Army. Germany sent all her best troops to the front at the very beginning; the sharp offensive brought them considerable losses, as great masses were engaged.
No doubt the new reinforcements will be weaker, but not so weak, I think, as is often stated in the Press.
To be able to take the offensive, the Germans have a relatively weaker reserve of men. The new levy must create a reserve and this reserve will be formed of older men, but perhaps the Allies will also be forced to levy older men.
Compare the following:—Westminster Gasette, October 20th: “I learn from a reliable source (says the Central News Amsterdam correspondent to-day) that within a short time men between the ages of fifty and fifty-five, who have already served in the army, will be called up in Germany.” Standard, Amsterdam, November 10th: “On November 15th Landsturm between the ages of forty and forty-three, who have not yet served, will be called up at Aix-la-Chapelle.” Times, December 3rd: “A Bill has been introduced in the Hungarian Parliament making men of fifty to fifty-five years of age liable to military service, but only to be employed within the country.” Times and other papers reported, 13th December, that Austria is going to levy even boys of seventeen years (?).
(2) Though German industry has been reduced, and consequently a considerable number of young workmen were set free for the war, yet the Germans need a great mass of strong and healthy people to keep their best industries going. That is the drawback of the industrialisation of the war.
This explains why Austria-Hungary, having a smaller industry, is able to raise a relatively larger army. Austria-Hungary did not call up all her forces at the beginning, as the Germans did, and therefore to-day she may still have relatively greater numbers of new soldiers.
(3) The dashing offensive against Paris, and then against Russia, did not succeed fully The German soldiers and the public are beginning to feel uneasy.
(4) I am inclined to think that the strategical plan of Germany miscarried from the beginning. Germany overrated her ally Austria, and she underrated Russia. Leaving the Russians and Serbians to Austria, the Germans made their perfidious invasion of Belgium and threw themselves against Paris, but being obliged to retreat in France they invaded Russia and Serbia. It would have served the German plan much better not to have violated Belgium, but to have defended their relatively short frontier against France and to have attacked with all violence the Russian Army. This was all the more to be expected, because Germany, led by the Emperor himself, in the beginning of the war proclaimed Russia as the deadly enemy. It is quite evident that the Germans changed their original plan, doing, after a year’s experience, what they might have done at the beginning.
(5) Very much is written about the starvation in Germany, and about the need of cutting off the supplies of the necessary food, wool, metals, &c.
I fear many futile hopes are still cherished in that respect. Food in Germany is scanty, but the people are not starving. Frugality and temperance, even fasting from time to time, does not demoralise a people; on the contrary, it may stimulate and make them more energetic. Soldiers who eat too much, fat soldiers, are worse than hungry ones—that is an old experience, of which we may read in Cæsar’s Commentaries.
