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As we now can expect that the Allied armies will co-operate, the number of seven millions should be sufficient. These numbers are necessary, for Germany will fight desperately and bring large quantities. So will Austria, and Turkey will be squeezed by the Germans and will provide further supplies of men. The expense of these huge armies will be fully made good by shortening the war.
In demanding soldiers—more soldiers, we demand by implication more ammunition and the necessary armaments; for soldiers without guns, rifles, high explosives, etc., are no soldiers at all! The Allied troops must undo all the advantages of the Enemy; heavy guns will be needed to destroy his trenches, machine-guns are of the greatest value, etc., etc.
21.—Is a Prolonged War Advantageous to the Allies?
I know that influential men admonished the English public to be prepared for a long war: a three years’, even a twenty years’ war has been prognosticated. It is argued that the Allies must necessarily win by the prolongation of the war, that Great Britain will be stronger in every respect, and the enemy will be weakened.
I understand quite well, why this argument was brought forward in a country which, owing to her historical development, was not prepared for a war with the Prussian soldiery. I shared this opinion, but only so long as it was necessary to prepare the army; and I doubt whether the enemy has been weakened in the degree supposed. The enemy is also making use of the time available, inventing new kinds of weapons, levying reinforcements, and last, not least, acquiring influence with the Neutrals. The prolongation of the war may easily be taken as hesitation and weakness. A victory only won after long delay is not only far more costly (Sir Edward Carson’s argument), but might easily be less efficacious and decisive. But the final victory must decisive, every kind of drawn game, doubtful for our cause, is a definite victory for the enemy. Having gained unquestioned victories in the initial stages of the war, he must be defeated sufficiently to give in and own his defeat.
The prolongation of the war would affect the financial power of the Allies; it is a question whether Italy, and even France and Russia, could stand the war as long as Britain. The Balkan States are positively afraid of a long war.
France, moreover, having to face the threatening depopulation of the country, will calculate the number of the losses caused by a prolonged every day war in the trenches.
22.—Will Economics End the War?
There is a widespread notion that economics, not strategy, will end the war; even officers in leading positions share this opinion. Yet despite the part played by economics, the final decision must inevitably be arrived at on the battlefield.
23.—Japan and the War.
In France, as I see from several publications, the military help of the Japanese has been seriously considered. National and racial sentiments (the yellow danger) are quite out of place, when once the English and now even the Russians are on friendly terms with Japan. Moreover, the Japanese are our Allies, and have helped already; there is thus no question of principle involved. No doubt the financial aspect would have to be considered. In the first place the
