Page:Aviation Accident Investigation - TWA crash on 6 May 1935 - Statement by Secretary Roper.pdf/3

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the plane to proceed into weather conditions which required a flight of a greater distance than permitted landing with the required 45 minute reserve fuel supply.

5. The regulations permit intentional instrument flying over or through fog, clouds or overcast only under certain conditions, one of which is that two-way communication is maintained with ground stations.

Official records show that the SKY CHIEF's radio transmitter was not functioning on night frequency when the plane cleared Albuquerque and that the official weather forecast indicated that instrument flying would be required along the route. The pilot's log also shows a notation made by Co-pilot Greeson, somewhere between Albuquerque and Kansas City, to the effect that the transmitter was out and the receiver was carrying very weak. Therefore, in view of the regulation requiring a two-way radio, the pilot should have landed at the nearest intermediate station, either Amarillo, Texas or Wichita, Kansas.

The plane also was directed by the Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., dispatcher at Kansas City to attempt a landing there despite the fact that the ceiling had fallen to below 700 feet, the minimum ceiling for landing down through to Kansas City appearing in the company's approved operation manual. If the pilot had followed these instructions, it would have been a violation.

Searching inquiry by the Accident Board, the Director and myself indicate that the Department of Commerce navigation aids and personnel in the area over which the plane was being flown were functioning properly at all times during the fatal flight.

In this connection it should be kept in mind that the Department is charged with aiding navigation by both establishing aids to air navigation and developing safer and improved methods of operation and drafting regulations helpful to the public and the industry, but that it is not a policing body. It does not have an inspection force of sufficient size to apprehend violations the moment they occur or to be able to prevent all violations. It exercises constant vigilance to set up regulations which will improve air line operations and, with the cooperation of operating companies and private flyers, enforces them stringently. Bureau regulations, particularly covering safety in flying, are stricter today than they ever have been before in history.

Discussion of two regulations which were changed by the Department, effective October 1, 1934, in regard to reserve fuel supplies to be carried by planes and maximum hours to be flown by pilots which has arisen in connection with the accident, indicates a misunderstanding of the facts.

The new regulation requiring pilots to carry in addition to the normal reserve, a sufficient fuel and oil supply to enable them to fly for 45 minutes after landing at their terminals or refueling points marked a distinct advance in behalf of safer flying. The former regulation provided that a pilot should carry a 35% fuel reserve. Under this old