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headset on, and then I was going to put my hand on his and stop him from putting further power on. At that instant, however, the thought occurred to me that I myself had pulled the flaps clear up to zero at the landing, and I felt that the only way they could have gotten down was for him to have put them down before I reached the cockpit. I therefore assumed that at was his own doing, and that there was nothing for me to do in the matter."
From further testimony of the first officer, it is apparent that he was not sufficiently familiar with the operation of the flap control switch. When asked if he had operated the flaps for the captain while landing earlier that day on the flight's arrival from New York, he answered, "Yes, . . . full flap for landing . . . 35 degrees." When asked what he did to get full flap, he answered that he turned the knob in a CLOCKWISE direction to the stop. This actually puts the switch in the "landing" or 20° position, yet he was of the opinion that at was the 35° position and that 35° flap was used for landing. As a matter of fact, to put the switch in the 35° position from any other position on the dial, you must rotate the knob in a COUNTER-CLOCKWISE direction to the stop (3:00 o'clock).
Donald H. Goodman, second officer and navigator of the subject flight, testified that he was seated at the navigator's table when the aircraft left the buoy and the engines were started, after which the aircraft was taxied out into the take-off area, where each engine was run up, and the magnetoes and propellers were checked. He stated, "It is the navigator's job to time the take-off and get the wind direction and velocity and the state of the sea, the swell and waves, so I made those observations, and I suppose the time of the take-off was from the time the manifold pressure has reached 30 inches, which I watched. When they reached 30 inches, I snapped the watch to start the take-off time; and then, because I happened to be
