Page:Axon Enterprise v. FTC.pdf/10

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
5

Opinion of the Court

Axon’s purchase of its closest competitor violated the FTC Act’s ban on unfair methods of competition. To stop the FTC from pursuing that charge, Axon did just what Cochran had—brought suit against the Commission in district court, premised on federal-question jurisdiction. Like Cochran, Axon asserted that the Commission’s ALJs could not constitutionally exercise governmental authority because of their dual-layer protection from removal. In addition, Axon claimed that the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the Commission renders all of its enforcement actions unconstitutional. See Complaint in No. 2:20–cv–00014 (D Ariz.), ECF Doc. 1, p. 26 (protesting that “the FTC will act as prosecutor, judge, and jury”). Again similarly to Cochran, Axon asked the court to enjoin the FTC “from subjecting” it to the Commission’s “unfair and unconstitutional internal forum.” Id., at 7; see id., at 28.[1]

Cochran’s and Axon’s suits met an identical fate in district court: dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court in Cochran’s case held that the review scheme specified in the Exchange Act—“administrative review followed by judicial review in a federal court of appeals”—“implicitly divest[s] district courts of jurisdiction” over “challenges to SEC proceedings,” including Cochran’s constitutional ones. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–1239, p. 141a. Likewise, the


  1. In this Court, Axon contends that it separately objected to “the uncodified, black-box ‘clearance’ process” used to determine whether the FTC or the Department of Justice will investigate a merger. Brief for Axon 13. We do not read the complaint that way. In count I, Axon raised the combination-of-functions claim; in count II, it raised the removal claim; and in count III, it asserted the view (not at issue here) that it did not violate the antitrust laws. See Complaint in No. 2:20–cv–00014 (D Ariz.), pp. 26–28. The single paragraph criticizing the clearance process appears only as background to Axon’s dual constitutional claims. Accord, 986 F. 3d 1173, 1181, n. 3 (CA9 2021) (case below) (noting that the three claims Axon pushed on appeal “do not line up with” Axon’s complaint). We therefore do not address the clearance-process issue.