Thomas, J., concurring
facts”). And, it may violate due process by empowering entities that are not courts of competent jurisdiction to deprive citizens of core private rights. See B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at 164 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[H]owever broadly ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ was defined, it would require quite a leap to say that the concept encompasses administrative agencies, which were recognized as categorically different from courts” (alteration omitted)); see also Hamburger 256 (“The guarantee of due process … bars the government from holding subjects to account outside courts and their processes”). Finally, the appellate review model may run afoul of the Seventh Amendment by allowing an administrative agency to adjudicate what may be core private rights without a jury. See Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417 (1987) (explaining that the Seventh Amendment ensures the right to a jury trial for all adjudications “analogous to ‘Suits at common law’ ”).
It is no answer that an Article III court may eventually review the agency order and its factual findings under a deferential standard of review. In fact, there seems to be no basis for treating factfinding differently from deciding questions of law. Both are at the core of judicial power, as Article III itself acknowledges. See §2, cl. 2 (providing that this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is “both as to Law and Fact”); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011). For much of the Nation’s history, it was understood that Article III precluded “the political branches” from exercising “power over the determination of individualized adjudicative facts when core private rights were at stake.” Nelson 593 (emphasis deleted); see also Hamburger 297. It is obvious that Article III “would not be satisfied if Congress provided for judicial review but ordered the courts to affirm the agency no matter what.” G. Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1247 (1994) (Lawson). And, “[t]here is no reason to think that it is any different if Congress instead simply orders courts to
