Page:Bergson - Matter and Memory (1911).djvu/224

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MATTER AND MEMORY
CHAP. III

of generality on its action, are really apart and are fully visible only in exceptional cases. In normal life they are interpenetrating, so that each has to abandon some part of its original purity. The first reveals itself in the recollection of differences, the second in the perception of resemblances: at the meeting of the two currents appears the general idea.

We are not here concerned to settle once for all the whole question of general ideas. Some there are that have not originated in perception alone, and that have but a very distant connexion with material objects. We will leave these on one side, and consider only those general ideas that are founded on what we have called the perception of similarity. We will try to follow pure memory, integral memory, in the continuous effort which it makes to insert itself into motor habit. In this way we may throw more light upon the office and nature of this memory, and perhaps make clearer, at the same time, by regarding them in this particular aspect, the two equally obscure notions of resemblance and of generality.

If we consider as closely as possible the difficulties of a psychological order which surroundNominalism and conceptualism revolve in a circle, each leading back to the other. the problem of general ideas, we shall come, we believe, to enclose them in this circle: to generalize, it is first of all necessary to abstract, but to abstract to any purpose we must already know