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"the perpetual striving of the mind to realize its own nature;" Hegel upon "the universal will;" Edwards and Dwight upon "benevolence;" Hickok upon "an imperative of reason," and so on for quantity.
The reason for this diversity of opinion is, that no abstract standard of collective morality is practicable. Humanity, infinitely various, is only measurable by itself. The ultimate rule of the moral is the actual. The relations into which communities of human beings spontaneously settle, by virtue of their intrinsic affinities and gravities, and under the impulsion of their tastes, desires and necessities, is the right as regards such communities; and, being the right, is their fundamental law. In other words, the principle upon which society organizes itself is the organic principle of such society; and, as such, is paramount to every rule of convention or enactment.
Society is the spontaneous expression by the people of their common character in relations. It obtains, wherever there is humanity, its aspects determined by the common disposition. It comes into being unconventionally, and can only be dissolved, legitimately, by natural decay, illegitimately, by the intrusion of exterior force. It is the basis upon which civil government is founded; and to protect its order, minister to its needs and interpret and enforce its relations, are the conditions upon which the title of government to maintain an existence depends. Such relations are, therefore, the embodiments of its supreme law. Hence, whether or not, an abstract standard for the admeasurement of moral qualities is, in the nature of things, possible, with such appraisals government can have no concern; for it is not in order for the creature to sit in judgment upon the creator.
Government is the conventional expression of the civil character of a people in institutes—organic and statutory—and in administration. In respect to authenticity, it differs from society in this: that the latter is the voice of the inherent qualities—the instincts—of the people, which are constant; the former of their opinions, which are variable. Mores—modes, manners, morals—the words have all the same signification—are manifestations of the fixed and durable; as, on the other hand, constitutions, statutes, precedents, decrees and resolutions, are of the fleeting and temporary. The former are natural facts—the out-croppings of underlying truth: the latter artificial contrivances; like their authors, transitory. The dynamics of the moral are the ana-
