Page:Black's Law Dictionary (Second Edition).djvu/136

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BENERTH

{{anchor+|.|BENERTH. A feudal service rendered by the tenant to his laid with plow and cart. Cowell.

{{anchor+|.|BENEVOLENCE. The doing a kind or helpful action towards another, under no obligation except an ethical one.

Is no doubt distinguishable from the words “ 'herality" and "char-’it_v:" fur, although iniiny charitable institutions are very properly called "benevolent," it is impossible to say that every object of a man's benevolence is also an ob- ]c'(‘l’ of his clmrity. James v. Allen, 3 l\ler. 17; Pull v. 1\.[Lfl'CEl'_ 4 R. 1. 4-13: Murdock v. Bridges, 91 his. 124, 39 Atl. -175.

In public law. Nouiinally a voluntary gratuity given by subjects to their king, but in reality a tax or forced loan.

{{anchor+|.|BENEVOLENT. Philanthropic ; hu- mane: having a desire or purpose to do good to men: intended for the conferring of benefits, rather thun for gain or profit.

This word is certainly more far wider raiiee than "cha gious:" it would include all gifts prompted liy good-will or kind feeling towards the recipient, whether an object of charity or not. The natural and usual meaning of the word would so extend it. It ‘uis no legal X11l':uJii],‘Z separate from its usual meaning, “Charitiible" has acquired iiscttled limiled meaning in law, which confines it within known lirnits. But in all the decisions in England on the subject it has been held that s devise or bequest for benevolent objects, or in trust to give to such objects, is too indefinite, and therifore void. l\orris v. Thomson. 19 N. J. mg. 313: Tlionison v. No N 4 525; Sutcr v. Hilliard, 132 M . . .4 - Peep. 444; Fox v. lxiblv-'. 86 Me. , 29 A . 940. This word, as applied to olnects or purposes, may refer to 4,2 which are in their n ilure CiJ3l‘ii'lliDie, and may also I .-.\e a broa-lcr meaning and include objects and purposes not chn ritnhle in the legal sense of thin word. Acts of kindness, friendship, forethought, or good- will might properly be described as henevulent. It has therefore been held that gifts to trustees to he applied fur "benevolent purposes" at their discretion, or to such "benevolent [inmoses" as they could agree upon. do not create 8. puhllc charity. But where the word is used in connection with other words expianatory of its meaning, and indicating the intent of the donor to limit it to purposes strictly charitable. it has been held to be svnonymous with, or equivalent to, "ii.ll1l'ii‘,8bie." Suter v. Hillinrd, 132 Mass. 412. 42 Am. Rep. 4-1-}: De Camp v. Dobbins. 3] N. J. Eq. 15: Ohatnlicrlain V. Stcnrns. 111 Mass. 3153: dale v. Mooney, 60

H. 5735, 49 Am. Iiep. .i~1.

—Benevn1e1|t associations. Those having it philanthropic or cliui-it-ihlc purpose, as distin- guished from such as are conducted for profit: spocilicnlly, “hen -fit associations" or "beneficial asst-citations." ‘din Bn.\.iairrr.—Benevo1ent nocietien. In l"~ “T311 1317. Societies st'ihlisli- ed and reg" tered under the friendly . deties act, 15175, for any charitable or benevolent purposes.

Benigna fneiendze lunt interpretationes charts:-um, ut re: magi: valeat quam perent: at qua liliet concessio fortissime contra. donatorem interpretanda est. Liberal interpretations are to be made of deeds. so that the purpose iniiy riither stand than fail; and every grant is to be

128

{{anchor+|.|BERCARIUS

taken most strongly against the grantor. Wallis v. Wnllls, 4 Mass. 135, 3 Am. Dec. 210: Hayes v. Kershow, 1 Saudi. 011. (N. Y.) 333, 268.

Benigne fnciendze siuit interprets.- tlancs, pi-upter slmplicitntem laicornm, nt l‘EI magi: vnleat qnam parent. Canstructions [of written instruments] are to be mnde liberally, on account of the simplicity of the lalty, [or common people] in order that the thing [or subject-l.u£i|‘:ter] may rather hiive e ect than perish, [or lIEC0l..L|e voirl.] Co. Litt. 36:1; Broom, Max. 510.

Benignior sententin. in vex-his genet- alihns sen dubiis, est prmfex-ends. I Coke, 15. The more favorable construction is to be placed on general or doubtful expresslorm.

Benignins loge: l.n.tex'pretanda aunt qllo vnluntna earnm conservetnr. Laws are to be more liberally interpreted. in order that their intent may be preserved. Dig. 1. 3. 18.

Bl-IQUEATH. To give personal property by will to another. Lzisher v. Lzisher, 13 Barb. (N. Y) 106.

Thls_word is the proper term for a testamentary git of personal property only, the word “dew :" being used with reference to real estate; but if the context clearly shows the intention of the tcstntor to use the word as synon- ymous with “devise," it may he held to pass real property. Dow v. Dow, 36 Me. 216: Burgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N. E 92: gan v. Logan. 11 Colo. 44 17 Par. 99: Laing v. Barbour, ll!) Mass. ’ Sclwlle v. Scholle, 11:; N. Y. 261. 21 N. E. 84: In l'e Feiruw'I Es" ite. 58 Pa. 427: Isiild v. Harvey. 21 N. H. 528: Evans v. Price, 118 Ill. 593. 8 N. E. 654.

{{anchor+|.|BEQUEST. A gift by will of personal property: :1 lezucy.

A specific bequest in one whereby the testator gives to the legatee all his property of ii certain class or kind: as all his pure personalty

A residiuzry bequest is a gift of all the remainder of the testatofs personal estate, after pa_VlilE'lJI', of debts and legacies, etc.

An €:Z'6C’ll[OT(l/ bequest is the bequest of a future. deferred, or contingent interest in personnlty.

A wndit-ional bequest is one the taking eflecl or continuing of which depends upon the happening or non-occurrence of a particular event. Mitchell v. Mitchell. I-13 Ind. 113, 42 N. E. 465: Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. 261. 2 Atl. 325. 5 At]. 682: Slerrlll v. College, 74 Wis. 415, 43 N. W. 10-1.

{{anchor+|.|BERDARIA. In Old English law, I sheepfold: nJso a place vihere the hiirk of trees was laid to tan.

{{anchor+|.|BERCARIUS, or EERCATOR. A Sheb-

herd.