Page:Black's Law Dictionary (Second Edition).djvu/20

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.


malicious and unfounded use of some regular icgai proceeding, obtains some advantage over his opponent. Wharton.

A malicious abuse of legal process is where the party employs it for some unlawful ob- ject. not the purpose which it is intended by the law to etfect; in other words, a perversion of it. Lauzon v. Charroux, 18 R. I. 467, 23 A121. 97‘ ; Mayer v. Waiter, 64 Pa. 283; Ba1'tIel;t v. Chrlsthlli’, G9 Md. 219. 14 At]. 518; King v. Johnston. 81 Wis. 578, 51 N. W. 1011; Kline v. Hibbard, 80 Hun. 50. 29 N. Y. Supp. 807.

AIBUT. To reach, to touch. In old law, the ends were said to abut, the sides to ad- join. Cro. Jac. 184. And see Iauvrence V. Kiilam, a Kan. 499, 511; Springfield V. Green, 120 Ill 26!). 11 N. E. 201.

. Property is described as “abutLing" on a street. road, etc., when it adjoins or is adja- cent thereto, either in the sense of_ actu-iliy touching it or ineing practically contiguous to it. bcing separated by no more than a smali and inconsiderabie distance, but not when an- other lot, a strcet, or any other such distance intervenes. Richards v. Cincinnati 31 Oh 506; Sprin;.:ficid v. Green, " “U E. 261: Cohen v. Clcwiand. 4:3 Ohi N. E. 589: Holt v. Somcrville. 127 a ass. Cincinnati v. Batsche, 52 Ohio St. 32-}. 40 N. E. 31. 27 L. R. A. 536; Code Iowa 1897. § 968.

{{anchor+|.|ABUTMENTS. The ends of a bridge, or those parts of it which touch the land. Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. Law, 108, 35 Am. Dec. 530.

{{anchor+|.|ABUTTALS. (From abut, q. -1).) Com- monly defined “the buttlhgs and boundings of lands. eist, west, north, and south. showing on what other lands. higinvzus, or places

they abut, or are limited and hounded." Co- weil: Tomi. {{anchor+|.|AC ETIAM. (Lat. And also.) Words

used to introduce the statement of the real cause of action, in those cases where it was necessary to allege a fictitious cause of action to give the court jurisdiction, and also the real cause, in compliance with the statutcs.

ac s1. (Lat. As 1:.) Townsh. Pi. 23, 27. These words frequently occur in old English statutes. Lord Bacon expounds their meaning in the statute of uses: “The statute gi\es entry. not sinlpliriter, but with an ac si." Bac. Read. Uses, Works, iv. 195.

{{anchor+|.|ACADEMY. In its original meaning, an association formed for mutual improvement, or for the advancement of science or art: in later use, a species of ednc'1t-ionai institution, of a gmtle between the common schoni .1nd the college Academy of Fine Arts v. Phila- delphia County. 22 Pa. 496; Commonwealth V. Banks, 198 Pa. 397. -18 Ail. 277; ]3iacL.well v. State, 36 Ark. 178.

{{anchor+|.|ACA1"I‘E. In French feudal law. A species of relief ; a seignoriai right due on e\ ery


change of a tenant. A feudal right which formeriy prevailed in Languedoc and Guy- enne, hcing attached to that species of hex itabie estates which were granted on the con- grasct ‘oi’ €77lIPlLj/EGlt\S'i.5‘. Guyot, Inst. Feod. c.

, 1..

{{anchor+|.|ACCEDAS AD CURIAM. writ out of chancery, directed to the shei-iii‘. for the removal of a repievin suit from a hundred court or court baron to one of the superior courts. See Fitzh. Nut. Brev. 18; 3 Bl. Comm. 34; 1 Tidd, Fr. 38.

{{anchor+|.|ACCEDAS AD VICE COMITEM. L. Lat. (You go to the sheriff.) A writ formerly directed to the Coroners of a county in England. commanding them to go to the sheriff, where the latter had suppressed and neglected to return a writ of pane, and to deliver a writ to him requiring him to return it. Reg. Orig. 83. See Pom-2.

An original

{{anchor+|.|ACCELERATION. The shortening of the time for the vesting in possession of an expectant interest.

{{anchor+|.|ACCEPT. To receive with approval or satisfaction; to receixe with intent to ictaln. Also, in the capacity of drnwee of a bill. to recognize the draft, and engage to pay it when due.

{{anchor+|.|ACCEPTANCE. The taking and receiving of anything in good part, and as it were a tadt agreement to a preceding act, which might have been defeated or avoided if such acceptance had not been made. Brooke, Abr.

The act of a person to whom a thing is offered or tendered by another, whereby he receives the thing with the intention of retaining it, such intention being evidenced by a sufficient act.

The acceptance of goods sold under a contract which would be void by the statute of frauds without delivery and acceptance in- voives something more than the act of the Vendor in the delivery. It requires that the vendee should also act, and that his act should be of such a nature as to indicate that he receives and accepts the goods delivered as his property. He must receive and retain the articles delivered, intending there- by to assume the title to them. to constitute the acceptance mentioned in the statute. Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 524. See also, Snow v. Warner, 10 Metc. (Mass) 132. 43 Am. Dec. 417.

In mm-ine insurance, the acceptance of an abandonment ily the u_uderwriter is his assent. either etpress or to be implied from the surrounding circumstances. to the surficiency and regularity of the abandonment. Its etfect is to perfect the insured's right of action as for a total loss, if the cause of loss and circumstances have been truly disclosed. Rap. & Law.

Acceptance of a hill of exchange. meiczlntlie law.


The act by which the per-