restored to more than her former splendour. At the commencement of the French revolution, the Austrian dominions contained a population of 25,000,000,—as confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, their population is 27,926,000.—This mighty empire includes, at present, Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg and Berchstolgaden; Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Friuli, and Trieste; Galicia, Buckowine, Hungary, Transylvania, Sclavonia, Croatia, Venetian States, Istria, Dalmatia, Tyrol, Lombardy, and other acquisitions in Italy. The power of this empire is less than we might expect from its extent of population, owing, as is judiciously observed, to the want of that consonance of national manners, and that congeniality of national feeling, which are essential to case in governing, and which have long formed the strength of France and Britain.
The next article of considerable length is Baking, leaving which to the consideration of bakers and physicians, we pass on to a very intelligent paper on the Balance of Power.—We regret that the author has not developed more fully the clear and enlightened views which he entertains on this important subject, particularly as it is a subject not generally treated of in works of a similar nature. The policy of balancing the power of one state against another, was never pursued but in modern Europe—nor was it till the commencement of the sixteenth century, that the European states began to be formed into one grand federal league, to be the guardians of each other's interests. The ultimate intention of this system of policy was, to secure every state in the full possession of all its rights, by checking the first encroachments of ambition, watching the movements of foreign powers, and uniting their respective force in support of the weak against the strong. It was no part of this system to equalize the powers of the states composing the grand community—which is as impracticable as to preserve an equality of property among the individual members of a nation. The question is not what amount of power above another any state possesses, provided that power is fairly acquired, but whether any state possesses its power in such circumstances, as to enable it to trespass at will on a weaker neighbour. The ancients had certainly some idea of such a political equipoise; but whether that idea was merely speculative, or whether it influenced their political conduct, is a question which has divided some of our ablest writers. Mr Hume maintains, that the authority of this system was scarcely less extensive in ancient than in modern Europe; while Mr Brougham affirms, that in this department of politics, the ancients displayed nothing beyond a speculative knowledge. The truth seems to lie between these assertions. The great principle of preserving a due balance of power, is to be traced in many of the transactions of the Grecian states; but that principle was never so regular in its operation, nor so authoritative in its influence, as it has become among the modern nations of Europe. It was in Italy, divided into a number of small states and commonwealths, that this principle first assumed the appearance of system. Early in the fifteenth century, we see the balance of power becoming an object of constant concern among these states—and about the close of that century, these ideas began to extend to other quarters, and to influence the operations of mightier kingdoms. The beneficial effects of such a system are sufficiently obvious. It checked the frequency of wars—it was a barrier against the strong, and a bulwark to the weak. We heartily concur with the author of this article, in reprobating and lamenting the fatal violation of this salutary principle in the partition of Poland—which presented the alarming example of a deliberate, unchecked conspiracy against the independent existence of an unoffending country. With regard to the interest of Great Britain in the balancing system, it is very justly remarked, that our commerce and our colonies render it absurd to talk of our being insulated as an empire, because Britain is an island; and that we could not always be as secure, and as free from uneasy apprehension, in a state of total insulation from foreign connexions, as with friends or confederates to employ or oppose a formidable enemy on his own confines. We accord, likewise, in the observation, that it is often proper to watch and to warn, to use the influence of our remonstrances and counsels, without having recourse, except
