human capacity." Then follows the famous sceptical dilemma which was never, before or since, so clearly and forcibly put. "Do you," he continues (firstly), "follow the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object." (Then, secondly), "Do you disclaim' this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects." [1]
Now, when a man constructs a dilemma, it is well that he should see that both of its horns are in a condition to gore to the quick any luckless opponent who may throw himself upon either of their points. But Hume had only tried the firmness and sharpness of the second horn of this dilemma; and certainly its power of punishing had been amply proved by the mercilessness with which it had lacerated, during every epoch, the body of speculative science. But he had left untried the temper of the other horn. In the triumph of his overweening scepticism, he forgot to examine this alternative antler, no doubt considering its aspect too menacing to be encountered even by the most foolhardy assailant. But the horn was far less formidable than it looked. Berkeley had already thrown himself upon it, and though he did not find it to be exactly a cushion of down, he was not one whit damaged in the encounter. "I follow," says he, embracing the first of the alternatives, "I follow the instincts and prepossessions of nature. I assent to the veracity of sense, and I believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object, and on no account whatever will I consent 'to disclaim this principle.' Your philosophy—your more rational opinions— representation—your reasonings which, you say, necessitate me to depart from my primary instincts—all these I give, without reservation, to the winds. And now, what do you make of me?"[2] And if he had answered thus, as he would undoubtedly have done had he been alive, for such a reply is in harmony with the whole spirit of his philosophy, we do not, indeed, see what Hume, with all his subtle dialect, could have made of him. But the champion of common sense—he alone who could have foiled the prince of sceptics at his own weapons, was dead, [3] and the cause had fallen into the hands of Dr Reid, a far easier
- ↑ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. iv. pp. 177, 178, 179. Ed. 1826. We have abridged the passage, but have altered none of Hume's expressions.
- ↑ Vide Berkeley's Works, vol. i. pp. 182, 200, 203.—If the anachronism were no objection, a very happy and appropriate motto for Berkeley's works would be—
"Spernit Humum fugiente penna."
—Horace, Od. iii. 2, 24.Which we would thus translate—"He sets Hume at defiance with a pen, which the sceptic cannot trip." David Hume, however, was a very great man—great as a historian, as every one admits; but greater still as a philosopher: for it is impossible to calculate what a blank, but for him, the whole speculative science of Europe for the last seventy years would have been. If the reader wishes to see the character of his writings, and the scope of the sceptical philosophy fairly appreciated, we beg to refer him to an article in the Edinburgh Review (Vol. LII. p. 196 et seq., Art. Philosophy of Perception), written by Sir William Hamilton, and which, in our opinion, contains more condensed thought and more condensed learning than are to be found in any similar number of pages in our language, on any subject whatever. It gives us great pleasure to see that the writings of this distinguished philosopher, extracted from the Edinburgh Review, have been translated into French (Paris, 1840) by M. Peisse, a very competent translator, who has prefixed to the work an introduction of his own, not unworthy of the profound disquisitions that follow.
- ↑ Was dead. This is not precisely true, for Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature,' from which the above extract is taken, was published in 1739, and Berkeley did not die until 1753. But we explain it by saying that Hume's work fell dead-born from the press, and did not attract any degree of attention until long after its publication;
