not be loath to re-enact his part of honest broker, and to pocket his commission in the shape of whatever facilities we may think fit to afford to his colonial policy. France, in spite of all that we have recently conceded to her, is a more doubtful factor; for there has been of recent years a very close understanding between Paris and St Petersburg, and any war in which we might be engaged that would make Egypt a matter of secondary consequence, would afford a temptation which the Republic might find it hard to resist. Perilous as the situation is, there is still ground for hoping that the counsels of the Powers may persuade Russia to moderation, and that a war may be obviated, the limits and results of which no diplomatic foresight is capable of determining.
The spirited conduct of the Indian Government will also not be without effect. Lord Dufferin is already bustling to get 50,000 men at once ready for the field, and the native princes are equally enthusiastic; for Sindiah has, it is said, placed his troops at the disposal of Government. If Herat should fall into the hands of the Russians, it will be no fault of the Indian Government, but due rather to the incapacity of a Cabinet which never yet could perceive danger except to suit its own views, or meet an emergency when brought face to face with it.
Should war be providentially averted, the present scare will not be without profit. It will have rung the knell of "masterly inactivity," which has indeed been dying a natural death for several years past. It will force us to realise, what we ought all along to have been aware of, that Afghanistan can only stand by British protection and assistance. We shall have to re-do all that the present Government foolishly – we may say wickedly – undid. We shall not merely have to again garrison Kandahar, but we shall have to place the security of Herat, and the due observance of whatever frontier may be adopted, under the charge of British officers, if not British-Indian troops. In no other way can we guarantee that a pretext for further aggression will not be afforded to Russia; and experience has taught us that a so-called "imperious necessity" may at any time cause her to override all her pledges. As we have said above, the protection of Herat must necessarily henceforth devolve upon ourselves, for the Afghans are not able for such a task, neither are they to be implicitly trusted. If we look at the immediate crisis in the light of a lesson, and read it rightly, we shall not have much cause to regret our present alarm. If we trifle with it, as we have hitherto done with all similar warnings, the day cannot be far distant when the question of Britain's existence as an Eastern Power must be put upon its trial.
