Per Curiam
and adaptive deficits were related.” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). But “in the medical community,” those “traumatic experiences” are considered “ ‘risk factors’ for intellectual disability.” Ibid. (quoting AAIDD–11, at 59–60).
Fourth, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals required “Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to ‘a personality disorder.’ ” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (quoting Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 488). But clinicians recognize that the “existence of a personality disorder or mental-health issue… is ‘not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.’ ” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (quoting Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Moore v. Texas, O. T. 2016, No. 15–797, p. 19).
Fifth, the appeals court directed state courts, when examining adaptive deficits, to rely upon certain factors set forth in a Texas case called Ex parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 486, 489. The Briseno factors were: whether “those who knew the person best during the developmental stage” thought of him as “mentally retarded”; whether he could “formulat[e] plans” and “car[ry] them through”; whether his conduct showed “leadership”; whether he showed a “rational and appropriate” “response to external stimuli”; whether he could answer questions “coherently” and “rationally”; whether he could “hide facts or lie effectively”; and whether the commission of his offense required “forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose.” 135 S. W. 3d, at 8–9.
We criticized the use of these factors both because they had no grounding in prevailing medical practice, and because they invited “lay perceptions of intellectual disability” and “lay stereotypes” to guide assessment of intellectual disability. Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Emphasizing the Briseno factors over clinical factors, we said, “ ‘creat[es] an unacceptable risk that persons with
