Page:Bostock v. Clayton County (2020).pdf/164

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BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Kavanaugh, J., dissenting

That common usage in the States underscores that sexual orientation discrimination is commonly understood as a legal concept distinct from sex discrimination.

And it is the common understanding in this Court as well. Since 1971, the Court has employed rigorous or heightened constitutional scrutiny of laws that classify on the basis of sex. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 531–533 (1996); J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136–137 (1994); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197–199 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 682–684 (1973) (plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75–77 (1971). Over the last several decades, the Court has also decided many cases involving sexual orientation. But in those cases, the Court never suggested that sexual orientation discrimination is just a form of sex discrimination. All of the Court’s cases from Bowers to Romer to Lawrence to Windsor to Obergefell would have been far easier to analyze and decide if sexual orientation discrimination were just a form of sex discrimination and therefore received the same heightened scrutiny as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986); Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015).

Did the Court in all of those sexual orientation cases just miss that obvious answer—and overlook the fact that sexual orientation discrimination is actually a form of sex discrimination? That seems implausible. Nineteen Justices have participated in those cases. Not a single Justice stated or even hinted that sexual orientation discrimination was just a form of sex discrimination and therefore entitled to the same heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The opinions in those five cases contain no trace of such reasoning. That is presumably because everyone on this Court, too, has long understood that sexual orientation