curiam). “That threshold requirement ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1923. To establish standing, a plaintiff has the burden of clearly demonstrating that she has: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 518); accord Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (noting the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss).
To establish an injury in fact, “a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’” Id. The plaintiff must establish a “particularized” injury, which means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). Moreover, “[a]lthough imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). Where a plaintiff has not established the elements of standing, the case must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may be either facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the court may dismiss a complaint when the allegations of and documents attached to the complaint are insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In this context, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.
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