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told the agent to return for his laundry later, the latter merely showed his badge and stated, "I am a federal narcotics agent." He said nothing about an arrest. There then occurred the action by Toy that forced upon the officer a split-second decision and demonstrated to him that immediate arrest was necessary. Toy slammed the door shut and fled toward the rear of the laundry. If he had narcotics on the premises he could conceal or destroy them in an instant. The door was not slammed when the man at the door inquired for laundry; it was slammed when the officer's badge was exhibited. The officer then had cause to believe Toy guilty, for an unexplained flight from an officer is strong indication of guilt.
3. Petitioners contend that the absence of affirmative evidence that the officer stated his purpose to arrest Toy brings the case within the prohibition of Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301. The language of Miller itself answers this contention. This Court there noted decisions (p. 309) "holding that justification for noncompliance [with the requirement of statement of purpose] exists in exigent circumstances, as, for example, when the officers may in good faith believe * * * that the person to be arrested is fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6."
C. In the case of the arrest of Wong Sun, probable cause for arrest was provided by the combined, consistent statements of Yee and petitioner Toy. Yee's accusation of "Sea Dog" (Wong Sun) as the supplier (with Toy) of his narcotics was significantly corroborated before the officers went to arrest Wong
