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fact that the informant had given specific information of the defendant's appearance and manner which observations by the officers could corroborate.[1] The courts have held that information given by persons under arrest or by their friends is entitled to credence so that when it is corroborated only slightly the total circumstances can and do amount to probable cause for an arrest. See Thomas v. United States, 281 F. 2d 132 (C.A. 8), certiorari denied, 364 U.S. 904, where the court found probable cause for an arrest in statements by relatives of thieves that stolen property had been sold to the defendant. Indeed, the court below in Rodgers v. United States, 267 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 9),[2]
- ↑ On the other hand, in some of the cases, information given by informers was held insufficient because it was stale or because it was not specific. E.g., in Cervantes v. United States, 263 F. 2d 800, 804–805 (C.A. 9), cited by petitioners (Pet. Br. 9), the court did not reach the question whether a sufficient showing was made as to the "trustworthiness" of the informant—since the informant's information related to incidents 6 to 10 weeks before the arrest. In People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, cited by petitioners (Pet. Br. 9), the objection to the information was not to the absence of past experience with the informer (he had three times provided valid information), but with the lack of specificity—such information would cause arrest of "any Negro anywhere in San Francisco driving a [1953 Oldsmobile '98' convertible with a black top and light body]" (Id., 123, 129). The court sustained the arrest, however, upon the additional element of flight.
- ↑ This decision was cited in the opinion below for the requirement that the person furnishing information be "reliable", but nothing in Rodgers bases "reliability" exclusively upon past furnishing of information. To the contrary, in Rodgers the addict who accused the defendant had theretofore had no contact with the agents (id., 83).
631490—62——3
